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Abstract
We study black-box reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design for welfare maximization
in settings of incomplete information. Given oracle access to an algorithm for an underlying optimization
problem, the goal is to simulate an incentive compatible mechanism. The mechanism will be evaluated on
its expected welfare, relative to the algorithm provided, and its complexity is measured by the time (and
queries) needed to simulate the mechanism on any input. While it is known that black-box reductions
are not possible in many prior-free settings, settings with priors appear more promising: there are
known reductions for Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism design for general classes of welfare
maximization problems. This dichotomy begs the question: which mechanism design problems admit
black-box reductions, and which do not?
Our main result is that black-box mechanism design is impossible under two of the simplest settings
not captured by known positive results. First, for the problem of allocating n goods to a single buyer
whose valuation is additive and independent across the goods, subject to a downward-closed constraint
on feasible allocations, we show that there is no polytime (in n) BIC black-box reduction for expected
welfare maximization. Second, for the setting of multiple single-parameter agents—where polytime
BIC reductions are known—we show that no polytime reductions exist when the incentive requirement
is tightened to Max-In-Distributional-Range. In each case, we show that achieving a sub-polynomial
approximation to the expected welfare requires exponentially many queries, even when the set of feasible
allocations is known to be downward-closed.
1 Introduction
A central question in algorithmic mechanism design is determining whether a class of incentive compatible
mechanism design problems is or is not more computationally difficult than its algorithmic counterpart.
One way to address this question is with a black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design.
Given oracle access to some algorithmic solution to an allocation problem, is it possible to implement an
incentive compatible mechanism with similar performance? Such reductions, when they exist, show not only
that mechanism design is no harder than algorithm design, but also that one can handle separately the
algorithmic and economic aspects of a given problem.
A black-box transformation is specified by a number of parameters. There is an algorithmic optimization
problem, where the goal is to maximize some objective subject to a feasibility constraint. For example, one
might want to maximize expected welfare in an allocation problem, where (a) the agents have valuations for
goods drawn from some known distribution, (b) the goal is to assign goods in order to maximize aggregate
value, and (c) the assignment is subject to some packing constraint(s). On top of this there is a desired
incentive property, such as Bayesian incentive compatibility. A black-box transformation is given query
access to an algorithm A for the algorithmic optimization problem. On a given input, the transformation
must simulate a mechanism M that satisfies the incentive property, while (approximately) preserving the
objective value of A. Importantly, the transformation has access to the input distribution, but not the
feasibility constraint. In this way, the transformation must rely on A to solve the underlying optimization,
and cannot simply disregard A in favor of implementing an unrelated incentive compatible mechanism. We
measure the runtime of the reduction in terms of the maximum number of queries made to A, plus any side
computation, to simulate the mechanism on any single input.
Black-box reductions with priors have been most commonly studied for welfare maximization problems.
Hartline and Lucier [11] initiated this line of study by providing a black-box reduction from Bayesian incentive
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compatible mechanism design to algorithm design for welfare maximization problems with single-dimensional
agent types. Subsequently, Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian [10] and Bei and Huang [2] provided black-box
reductions for ǫ-approximate Bayesian incentive compatibility for arbitrary (i.e., multi-dimensional) agent
types, and this was recently improved to a reduction for exact BIC for multi-dimensional types [9]. The
runtime of these reductions depends on a measure of the size of each agent’s type space; we will discuss this
in more detail later. On the other hand, it is known that prior-free reductions for DSIC mechanism design
cannot approximately preserve worst-case approximation guarantees, even for single-parameter settings [6].
Between these known possibility and impossibility results, a rich space of natural open questions still lies
open.
1.1 Our Results
In this work we present two impossibility results for black-box reductions in settings of incomplete informa-
tion. Our main result is an impossibility theorem for multi-dimensional BIC welfare maximization: for the
problem of selling multiple goods to additive buyers with independent values across items, any polynomial-
time BIC black-box reduction must degrade the expected welfare by a polynomial factor. This is true
even for the special case of a single buyer, in which case BIC is equivalent to DSIC. Along the way, we
show a similar impossibility result for expected welfare maximization with single-parameter agents, when
the incentive constraint is tightened from BIC to Max-In-Distributional-Range (MIDR), a strengthening of
dominant strategy incentive compatibility [7].1 Importantly, the welfare target in this latter result is to
approximate the expected welfare of the provided algorithm, over the given prior, rather than match its
worst-case approximation factor (for which an impossibility result was previously known).
To illustrate the setting of our main result, consider the following toy example. A small cloud infras-
tructure platform serves a single large client, and we are tasked with building its pricing mechanism. The
cloud services are offered as Virtual Machines (VMs), which come in a variety of types (high-memory, CPU-
intensive, etc.). The customer can purchase multiple VMs of possibly multiple different types, and their
valuation is additive over VMs, although their value for each different type of VM is private information
and drawn independently from some distribution. However, the VMs themselves are simply abstractions: a
VM maps onto a collection of hardward resources, possibly in many different ways. Whether the platform
can feasibly serve a given multiset of VMs is driven by its internal infrastructure technology, and the pre-
cise details of this are opaque to us. An engineering team has provided an algorithm that maps any given
customer valuation to a proposed allocation, but this algorithm comes with no incentive guarantees. Our
job is to implement an incentive compatible mechanism for the user, using this algorithm as an oracle and
matching its expected welfare.
More generally, we are interested in black-box reductions from IC mechanism design to algorithm design
for allocating n goods to a single agent2 with additive valuation and independent values for each good, and
subject to some unknown downward-closed feasibility condition on the set of allowable allocations, with
the goal of maximizing social welfare. Our notion of incentive compatibility is dominant strategy incentive
compatibility, although we note that since there is only a single agent this corresponds with Bayesian incentive
compatibility. That is, the mechanism offers allocations and payments such that the agent maximizes their
expected outcome by reporting their true preferences.
Our main result is that any polytime black-box reduction that is DSIC, either with high probability or
in expectation over any randomization in the transformation, will necessarily degrade the expected welfare
of some algorithms by a factor of O(n1/4). Our lower bound makes use of the matching characterization of
incentive compatibility due to Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian [10]. Roughly speaking, any IC transforma-
tion must guarantee a certain max-in-range-style property across all subsets of agent types. However, since
the space of types is high-dimensional, it is possible to hide non-monotonicities that cannot be detected by
the transformation with a polynomial amount of exploration or sampling. Since the transformation cannot
distinguish scenarios with or without such non-monotonicities, it can achieve incentive compatibility only by
aggressively reducing allocations nearly everywhere. As a corollary, a polytime BIC reduction for the case
of n items and m agents must likewise degrade expected welfare by a polynomial factor for some algorithms.
1An allocation rule is MIDR if the distribution over outcomes returned on input x is at least as good, for x, as the distribution
returned on any other input.
2Our results in this setting are impossibility results, so they also apply to the case of multiple agents.
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At first glance, this impossibility result may seem at odds with known multi-dimensional reductions for
BIC welfare maximization discussed earlier [10, 9]. These known reductions have runtime that depends on the
support size of each agent’s typespace. The key distinction in our setting is that the type space for an additive
agent with independent values is inherently very large, being exponential in the number of goods (or, for the
continuous case, having polynomial doubling number [10, 9]). But the types can be described succinctly, due
to the assumed independence across items. This manifests as an exponential query complexity in the known
BIC reductions for multi-dimensional welfare. Our result can therefore be interpreted as showing that this
dependence on the support size is unavoidable, even for a single additive agent.
Along the way, we show an impossibility result for a related setting. Consider a scenario with n single-
parameter agents, each with an independently drawn value for service, and the problem is to determine
which subset of agents receive service subject to some downward-closed feasibility constraint. In this setting,
it is known that any DSIC black-box reduction must sometimes degrade the worst-case approximation factor
of the allocation oracle by a polynomial factor [6]. But it is an open question whether a DSIC black-
box reduction could (approximately) preserve the expected welfare of a general algorithm with respect to the
distribution over types. We make progress toward this question by showing that any black-box reduction from
Maximum-In-Distributional-Range (MIDR) mechanism design to algorithm design that runs in polynomial
time must sometimes reduce the expected welfare by a factor of Ω(n1/4). The MIDR condition, proposed
by Dughmi and Dobzinski [7], implies dominant strategy incentive compatibility; it is strictly stronger than
DSIC, but covers a very broad range of techniques for constructing DSIC mechanisms. As it turns out, the
matching characterization of IC, used in our main result for a single multi-dimensional additive agent, is
very related to the MIDR condition for n single-parameter agents. Our result leverages this relationship, and
indeed our lower-bound constructions for the two settings are very similar. We take this result as suggestive
that there is no black-box reduction from DSIC mechanism design to algorithm design for single-parameter
agents and the objective of expected welfare. We conjecture that this is true, but leave it as an open problem.
1.2 Further Related Work
As described above, BIC black-box reductions are known for a rich class of welfare maximization prob-
lems [11, 10, 2, 9]. In the prior-free setting, Babaioff, Lavi, and Pavlov also show that for a class of single-
minded combinatorial auction problems, one can achieve DSIC in a black-box way by losing a factor that is
logarithmic in the ratio between the largest and smallest possible agent values [1]. Dughmi and Roughgarden
show a black-box reduction for FPTAS algorithms that also applies in a broad range of multi-dimensional
welfare maximization problems [8]. There is also a significant line of work studying general methods for
converting certain types of algorithms into IC mechanisms [3, 12].
For the goal of revenue maximization, Cai, Daskalakis and Weinberg provide a BIC black-box reduction
for the case where buyers have valuations that are additive and independent across a collection of goods [4, 5].
Their approach reduces revenue maximization to welfare maximization by developing an appropriate notion
of virtual valuations. Like the multi-dimensional reductions for welfare described above [10, 2, 9], the running
time of their reduction is polynomial in the number of types of any agent. Our constructions use of the same
setting of additive valuations with independent values across goods. They also show how to improve the
runtime of their reduction to be polynomial in the number of agents and items under an item-symmetry
condition [4]. Our results imply that such a condition is necessary for polynomial runtime even for welfare
maximization.
The first impossibility result for black-box reductions in mechanism design was due to Chawla, Immor-
lica, and Lucier [6], who showed that no black-box reduction that guarantees dominant strategy incentive
compatibility (DSIC) can approximately preserve the worst-case approximation factor of a given algorithmic
oracle. Relative to that result, we relax the performance evaluation from worst-case welfare approximation to
expected welfare approximation, and strengthen the incentive compatibility constraint from DSIC to MIDR.
In addition to this result, Chawla, Immorlica and Lucier also showed that there is no black-box reduction
for BIC mechanisms with the objective of minimizing the makespan for single-parameter agents [6]. They
left as an open question whether there exists a black-box reduction for DSIC mechanisms with the objective
of maximizing expected welfare for single-parameter agents. We show that the answer is no for the stronger
incentive property of MIDR.
We focus primarily on black-box reductions with priors. For the setting without priors, Pass and Seth [13]
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build upon the impossibility result of Chawla, Immorlica, and Lucier to show that even if the transformation is
given access to the underlying problem’s feasibility constraint, black-box transformations are still impossible
under standard cryptographic assumptions. Suksompong [15] considers the case of downward-closed single-
parameter environments, and likewise shows limits on the power of black-box reductions.
Our negative result for BIC black-box reductions for an additive bidder applies in a setting with a
downward-closed feasibility constraint on the allocations. This is closely related to models of agent valua-
tions that are additive subject to a downward-closed constraint, such as k-additive valuations or additivity
subject to a matroid constraint. These models have recently attracted interest in the literature on revenue
maximization; for example, it is known that simple pricing methods can achieve a constant fraction of the
optimal revenue in any such environment [14]. Our impossibility result shows that even for the conceptually
simpler goal of maximizing expected welfare, no general reduction is possible when the downward-closed
constraint is not known to the transformation.
2 Model
We begin with some preliminaries before presenting our impossibility results for MIDR reductions for single-
parameter agents (Section 3) and for BIC reductions for an additive buyer (Section 4). We conclude with
future research directions in Section 5.
2.1 Preliminaries
A mechanismM = (A,P ), consists of (a) an allocation rule A : Xn → Y that takes as input the preferences
of n agents, each with a type space X , and outputs an outcome y ∈ Y; and (b) a payment function
P : Xn → Rn that computes the payment for every agent. An agent’s type is represented as a valuation
function vi : Y → R that assigns a non-negative real value to each outcome in Y. Given input vector v ∈ Xn,
each agent i derives value vi(A(v)) from the mechanism’s outcome. Agents are quasi-linear, so that the
utility of agent i on input v is vi(A(v)) − Pi(v).
The social welfare function Wel : Y × Xn → R is given by Wel(y, v) = ∑i vi(y). For simplicity, we
sometimes writeWel(A(v), v) asWel(A, v), the welfare of allocation rule A on input v. Given a distribution
D over valuations, we write Wel(A) , Ev∼D[Wel(A(v), v)] for the expected welfare of A.
A feasibility constraint is a subset of possible allocations F ⊆ Y. We are interested in the optimization
problem of maximizing (expected) welfare subject to a feasibility constraint.
2.2 Special Case: Resource Allocation
All of our lower-bound constructions will use the following class of resource allocation problems. There are
m types of goods and n agents. We can think of Y as a subset of Rn×m, so that y ∈ Y is a vector (yij)
and yij is the amount of good j allocated to agent i. Valuations are additive, with xij denoting the value of
agent i per unit of good j. In other words, X = Rm, and vi(y) =
∑
j xijyij .
Given y, z ∈ F , we will write z ≤ y to mean zij ≤ yij for all i and j. We say that a feasibility constraint
F is downward-closed if, whenever y ∈ F , we must also have z ∈ F for all z ≤ y. That is, if a given allocation
is feasible, then any other allocation obtained by taking goods away from agents is also feasible.
2.3 Incentive Constraints
We call a mechanism dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for every agent i, any v ∈ Xn and
any v′i ∈ X , it holds that vi(A(v)) − Pi(v) ≥ vi(A(v′i, v−i)) − Pi(v′i, v−i). I.e., no agent has an incentive to
misreport his true preference, for any declaration of the other agents.
The DSIC constraint requires that every agent prefers to declare his type for any types reported by
the other agents. A weaker notion of incentive compatibility is Bayesian incentive compatibility, where
every agent prefers to declare his type in expectation over the other agent reports. In particular, if agent
types come according to a product distribution D over Xn, we call a mechanism Bayesian incentive com-
patible (BIC) if for every agent i and any vi, v
′
i ∈ X , it holds that Ev−i∼D−i [v(A(vi, v−i)) − Pi(vi, v−i)] ≥
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Ev−i∼D−i [vi(A(v
′
i, v−i))−Pi(v′i, v−i)], where D−i is the distribution of all agent types other than i. Notably,
in the special case where there is only a single agent, the definitions of DSIC and BIC coincide.
We will also consider the class of “maximal-in-distributional-range” (MIDR) mechanisms [7].
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm A is maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) if, for all inputs v, v′ ∈
X , it holds that Ey∼A(v)[Wel(y, v)] ≥ Ey∼A(v′)[Wel(y, v)].
In other words, an allocation rule is MIDR if, for every input profile v, the expected welfare obtained
on input v would not be increased by instead returning the (random) allocation on any other input. The
MIDR property is a strengthening of DSIC, so any MIDR mechanism is DSIC when paired with appropriate
payments [7].
We will also be interested in DSIC mechanisms with a single agent. Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian [10]
provide a characterization of all the allocation rules that can be converted to BIC mechanisms. Since BIC
and DSIC coincide for a single agent, this characterization also applies to DSIC mechanisms with a single
agent. This is as follows:
for a subset of types X ′ ⊆ X , consider the following weighted bipartite graph G(X ′) constructed as
follows. The vertices of G(X ′) are (U, V ), where U = V = X ′. That is, each side of the bipartite graph is
a copy of X ′. For v, w ∈ X ′, the weight of edge (v, w) is taken to be Ez∼A(w)[v · z]. That is, the weight of
(v, w) is the value that type v has for the (possibly randomized) outcome generated for type w.
A matching m of G(X ′) is subset of edges of G(X ′) such that each vertex is incident with at most one
edge. For a given vertex v incident with an edge in the matching, we will write m(v) for the node matched
with v.
Theorem 1 ([10]). Mechanism A is BIC if and only if, for every X ′ ⊆ X , the maximum weighted matching
in G(X ′) is the identity matching, m(v) = v for all v ∈ X ′.
2.4 Black-Box Transformations
We consider the following general setup for black-box transformations. We are given sample access to a prior
distribution D over Xn, and the designer’s objective is to maximize expected welfare subject to a feasibility
constraint F ⊆ Y. The feasibility constraint F is not known. Instead, we are given black-box access to a
possibly randomized algorithm A : Xn → Y that returns allocations in F . We can query A on any input
and observe the resulting allocation. The designer’s goal is to implement a mechanism MA = (A′, P ) with
the following guarantees:
• A′ only returns outcomes in F .
• MA satisfies a desired incentive guarantee, e.g., BIC or DSIC.
• A′ achieves comparable welfare to A. That is, Wel(A′) should approximate Wel(A).
We will tend to write M for a black-box transformation, which is defined with respect to oracle access
to an allocation algorithm. We will writeMA for the mechanism implemented by this transformation given
oracle access to algorithm A.
Let us briefly comment on the first requirement, feasibility. Since F is unknown, the requirement that
range(A) ⊆ F can only be satisfied by using algorithm A to learn feasible outcomes. One way to guarantee
feasibility is to only ever return outcomes that are output by A on some input. For general feasibility
constraints, this is the only way to guarantee feasibility. However, in some cases, the designer may know
that F satisfies some property (such as downward-closedness), in which case it’s possible to determine an
outcome is feasible without observing it as an output of A. For example, if A is observed to allocate to
agents 1 and 2 simultaneously, then for a downward-closed constraint one can infer that it is also feasible to
allocate only to agent 1.
2.4.1 Query Complexity
We emphasize that our interest is in computationally efficient black-box transformations that guarantee
our desired incentive and objective constraints. For each of the incentive constraints we consider, it is
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straightforward to construct a transformation without any loss of welfare if there were no contraints on
runtime or query complexity. For example, one can transform any algorithm into a MIDR mechanism by
first querying the algorithm on every possible input, then returning the welfare-maximizing allocation from
the resulting range of outcomes. However, this transformation is impractical when the number of possible
input profiles is large. We study whether more efficient transformations exist that only need to query A at
a polynomial (in n and m) number of points in order to simulate an IC mechanism on any given input.
To this end, we define the query complexity of a transformationM to be the maximum number of queries
to the original function A that need to be performed in order to compute the value of the transformed function
A′(x) at any given point x.
Remark 1. While the definition of the problem allows the input algorithm A to be randomized, it is without
loss of generality to assume that it is deterministic. Indeed, if we consider the deterministic algorithm A˜
obtained by sampling A on every input, the expected welfare of A˜ will be indentical to that of A. As A˜ must
return the same value at a point x when queried multiple times, we can fix the random seed of the algorithm
A in advance before performing the conversion.
3 A Lower Bound for MIDR Transformations
In this section we restrict our attention to a welfare maximization problem with n single-dimensional agents,
meaning that there is only a single type of good (i.e., m = 1). The optimization is subject to a downward-
closed feasibility constraint. Indeed, it will actually suffice to consider binary types and binary outcomes:
the type space will be X = {0, 1}n, and the outcome space is Y = {0, 1}n. That is, each agent either has a
unit of value for being served, or no value for being served; and each agent either receives a unit of service
or none.
We can think of an input profile as a subset of agents, corresponding to those with value 1. Similarly, an
allocation is also associated with a subset of agents: those who receive a unit of service. With this in mind,
we will sometimes represent inputs and outcomes as sets for notational convenience.
We will show that even in this very restricted setting, any black-box reduction from single-dimensional
MIDR mechanism design to algorithm design with polynomial query complexity must degrade the expected
welfare by a polynomial factor.
Theorem 2. There are constants ǫ > 0 and c > 0 such that the following is true. For any MIDR black-
box transformation M with query complexity enǫ , there exists an algorithm A and distribution D such that
Wel(MA) ≤ Wel(A)nc . This is true even if the feasibility constraint F is known to be downward-closed.
Before going into the full details of the lower bound construction, let us describe the high-level intuition
behind Theorem 2. We will have n agents with binary types, where each agent has value 1 with probability
roughly 1/
√
n, so that the expected number of agents with value 1 is roughly
√
n. Outcomes are also binary,
with each agent either getting service or not. The allocation algorithms we consider are very simple: they
just serve all agents with value 1 (as long as there aren’t too many), subject to the following exception. There
are two hidden subsets of agents S and T , each of size roughly
√
n, which have a non-trivial intersection.
If the set of agents with value 1 contains many agents from T , but too few agents from S (where |S ∩ T |
counts as “too few”), then the algorithm will instead return the zero allocation. We will write AS,T for the
algorithm with a certain choice of the hidden sets S and T . See Figure 2 for an illustration of AS,T . What
we will show is that for any polytime MIDR black-box transformation, there is some choice of S and T for
which M substantially reduces the welfare of AS,T .
We establish the result in three steps. First, we argue that when given black-box access to a random
AS,T , a polytime MIDR transformation will generate low expected welfare on input T with high probability.
This step is formalized in Lemma 3 below. To see why this is true, consider what the transformation can do
on input T (i.e., when the agents in T are precisely the ones with value 1). On this input, the oracle AS,T
returns the zero allocation. And since S and T are chosen at random, the transformation does not know the
identity of set S on input T . Moreover, because of the high dimensionality of the space, the transformation
will not be able to find set S with any polynomial number of samples. This means that any input it queries
with large intersection with T will generate the zero allocation with high probability. Because of this, the
transformation will necessarily generate low expected welfare on input T . Note that this does not directly
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imply that the mechanism has low welfare overall, since we have so far argued only about its output on a
single input.
In the second step, we argue that on any input with a large enough intersection with T , the mechanism
must again generate low welfare. This step is given as Lemma 4. This follows from the MIDR property:
since the mechanism generates low welfare on input T , the distribution over outputs generated on any input
must also have low welfare for input T . On input S, for example, the oracle AS,T allocates to all agents in
S, but this would generate welfare |S ∩ T | for input T , which (if we choose our parameters carefully) will
be too high and violate the MIDR condition. So the transformation must avoid allocating too much to the
agents in S ∩T . This does not complete the proof of Theorem 2, though, since most inputs do not have high
intersection with T .
In the third and final step, we argue that the mechanism must generate low welfare on almost all inputs.
We establish this step in Lemma 5. The idea is that, by the curse of dimensionality, the transformation
cannot determine by sampling whether or not a random input has high intersection with T . In particular,
the only way to determine whether an input vector contains S ∩ T is to find an input very close to T (on
which AS,T returns ∅), which requires a super-polynomial number of samples. This means that, on most
inputs, the transformation cannot rule out that the input contains S ∩ T . However, by the previous step,
the mechanism must generate low welfare on any such input. This ultimately leads to the catastrophic loss
of welfare in Theorem 2.
We now proceed with the details of the proof of Theorem 2. Choose some sufficiently small constant
ǫ > 0. For notational convenience, we will define constants N , εST , εS , and εT . These constants will be used
to formalize the allocation rule AS,T described informally above. Roughly speaking: N is the maximum
number of agents who can declare 1 before the algorithm returns the zero allocation. Constant εST will
define the size of the intersection |S ∩ T |. Constants εS and εT determine what is meant by “too few agents
from S” and “too many agents from T ,” respectively, in the description of AS,T given above. We will set
these to be εST , n
−1/4, εS , 2n
−1/4, εT , 16n
−1/2, and N , n1/2+2ǫ.
The distribution D selects x ∈ X by independently drawing every coordinate xi ∼ Bernoulli
(
3N
4n
)
.
We say that a pair of subsets of coordinates S, T ⊆ [n] is valid if |S| = |T | = N2 and |S ∩T | = εSTN . We
consider the following family of algorithms, parameterized by a valid pair of subsets S and T .
AS,T (x) =


x if |x| ≤ N and
(
|x ∩ T | ≤ εTN or |x ∩ S| ≥ εSN
)
∅ otherwise
In other words, AS,T (x) simply allocates 1 to every agent who declared value 1, as long as there are at
most N , unless those agents overlap significantly with T but not with S. See Figure 2 for an illustration of
the allocation rule AS,T (x). We will define the feasible allocations associated with S and T , FS,T , to be all
allocations in the range of AS,T and their downward closure. That is, R ∈ FS,T if and only if there exists
some R′ ∈ range(AS,T ) such that R ⊆ R′.
We will make repeated use of the following lemma, which follows directly from the Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound.
Lemma 1. Suppose x1, . . . , xk are i.i.d. binary random variables, with X =
∑
i xi. Then for any constant
Y ≥ 3 · E[X ], we have Pr[X > Y ] < e−Y/4.
Proof. Write Y = (1+δ)E[X ]. Then by the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, Pr[X > (1+δ)E[X ]] < e−δ
2E[X]/(2+δ).
The result follows by noting that (δ + 1)/4 ≤ δ2/(2 + δ) for all δ ≥ 2.
To prove Theorem 2 we will show that, for any MIDR transformation M with query complexity enǫ ,
there is an algorithm AS,T satisfying the conditions of the theorem. We begin by noting that, for any valid
pair S and T , algorithm AS,T has welfare at least N/4.
Lemma 2. For any valid pair S and T , Wel(AS,T ) ≥ N4 = Ω(N).
Proof. Note first that Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds imply that
Prx∼D[|x| ∈ [N/2, N ]] = Prx∼D[|x| −E[|x|] > N/4] < e−N/64 < 1/4
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(a)
S T
(b)
S T
(c)
S T
(d)
S T
|x| > N
✗
|x| ≤ N
X
|x ∩ T | > ǫTN
|x ∩ S| < ǫSN
✗
|x ∩ T | > ǫTN
|x ∩ S| ≥ ǫSN
X
Figure 1: Allocation rule AS,T , parameterized by sets S and T (dashed green). On input x (solid red), the
allocation is either the all-zero allocation (red X) or the set x itself (green checkmark). (a) Any x with
|x| > N returns an empty allocation. (b) Most sets x with |x| ≤ N return allocation x, but (c) if x has a
large intersection with T then AS,T returns the empty allocation, unless (d) x also has a large intersection
with S.
Figure 2: An illustration of the allocation rule used to prove Theorem 2.
for sufficiently large N .
Next, note that each of the N/2 coordinates in T will lie in x independently with probability 3N4n . The
expected size of x ∩ T is therefore 3N28n . By Lemma 1, Prx∼D[|x ∩ T | > εTN ] < e−εTN/4 since εTN > 9N
2
8n .
Again, this probability is at most 1/4 for sufficiently large N .
By taking a union bound over these events, we conclude that |x| ∈ [N/2, N ] and |x ∩ T | ≤ εTN with
probability at least 1/2. This implies that AS,T (x) = x, with |x| ≥ N/2, with probability at least 1/2. The
expected welfare of AS,T is therefore at least N/4.
Fix a MIDR black-box transformation M. For notational convenience, we will write MS,T = MAS,T .
To prove Theorem 2, we wish to find a valid pair S and T such that Wel(MS,T ) is small. To this end, we
will imagine selecting the sets S and T uniformly at random, subject to being a valid pair. Write Γ for the
uniform distribution over all valid pairs (S, T ). Note that drawing (S, T ) ∼ Γ is equivalent to the following
process: first choose the N/2 coordinates of S, then choose the εSTN coordinates of S to form T ∩ S, then
choose the (1/2− εST )N coordinates of [n]\S to form T \S. We will write ΓT for the uniform distribution
over sets S such that (S, T ) is a valid pair, and similarly for ΓS .
The next lemma shows that, with high probability (over the random choice of S and T and over any
randomness in the transformation), MS,T will have low welfare on input T . Note that this lemma does not
make use of any incentive properties ofMS,T . Rather, it follows from the assumption that MS,T has query
complexity at most en
ǫ
, which is not enough samples to find a high-welfare outcome on input T .
Lemma 3. Pr(S,T )∼Γ[Wel(MS,T , T ) > εTN ] < enǫ · e−(ǫS−ǫST )N/4 = O(e−n1/4).
Proof. Choose some valid pair S and T . In order for Wel(MS,T , T ) to be greater than εTN , it must be
that on input T , the transformation must query at least one input x such that |AS,T (x) ∩ T | > εTN . Any
such x must satisfy |x| ≤ N , |x ∩ T | > εTN , and AS,T (x) = x. From the definition of AS,T (x), this can
occur only if |x ∩ S| ≥ εSN . And since |S ∩ T | = εSTN , this requires that |x ∩ (S \ T )| ≥ (εS − εST )N .
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Now fix any x and any set T such that |T | = N/2 and |x\T | ≤ |x| ≤ N , and consider the event
|x ∩ (S \ T )| ≥ (εS − εST )N with respect to a randomly chosen S ∼ ΓT . As each coordinate in the
complement of T is in S \ T independently with probability p , |S\T |n−|T | = (1/2−ǫST )Nn−N/2 , the event that
|x∩ (S \ T )| ≥ (εS − εST )N is at most the probability that N indicator variables, each 1 with probability p,
sum to at least (εS − εST )N .
By Lemma 1, this probability is at most e−(ǫS−ǫST )N/4, as long as
(ǫS − ǫST )N > 2N · (1/2− ǫST )N
n−N/2 .
We note that since ǫS = 2ǫST , this is implied by ǫST > 2N/n, which is satisfied by the setting of our
parameters.
We conclude that, for any T and any query point x, PrS∼ΓT [|AS,T (x) ∩ T | ≥ εTN ] < e−(εS−εST )N/4.
Taking a union bound over the (at most) en
ǫ
samples taken by the mechanism yields the desired result.
We have now established that mechanism MS,T has low welfare on input T , with high probability.
The MIDR property therefore implies that MS,T cannot generate outcomes that have high (expected)
intersection with T , on any input, again with high probability. Our next lemma uses this to show that, with
high probability, MS,T will have low welfare on any input x that contains S and for which x ∩ T = S ∩ T .
For convenience, define ζ , 2en
ǫ
e−ǫTN/6. For our choice of parameters, ζ → 0 as n → ∞ faster than any
polynomial in n.
Lemma 4. Choose S with |S| = N/2 and some x ⊃ S with |x| ∈ [N/2, N ]. Then
ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , x)
∣∣x ∩ T = S ∩ T ] ≤ 4N(εT + ζ)
εST
= O
(
N
n−1/4
)
.
Proof. Fix some x and some S ⊆ x with |S| = N/2. For any T such that S and T are a valid pair, and for
which T ∩ S = T ∩ x, the MIDR property applied to mechanism MS,T implies that
Wel(MS,T , T ) ≥ Ey∼MS,T (x)[T · y].
Taking an expectation over a uniformly random T satisfying the conditions above, we have that:
ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , T )] ≥ ET∼ΓS [Ey∼MS,T (x)[T · y]]. (1)
The left hand side is at most 2εTN , by Lemma 3 plus the fact that Wel(MS,T , T ) ≤ |T | = N/2 uncondi-
tionally. To bound the right-hand side, we will argue that the transformation is unlikely to gain information
about the identity of set T while querying on input x, over randomness in the transformation and over the
choice of set T .
To establish this claim, consider a baseline algorithm A such that A(x) = x for all |x| ≤ N and A(x) = ∅
for all |x| > N . That is, A behaves like AS,T except that there are no hidden sets S and T . We will
show that the transformation cannot distinguish AS,T from A, which implies that the transformation gains
no information about the identity of set T . More precisely, we will bound the probability, over T and
any randomness in the transformation, that on input x, the transformation queries any point z such that
A(z) 6= AS,T (z). In order for A(z) 6= AS,T (z), it must be that either
1. |(z ∩ T ) \ S| > εTN/2, or
2. |(z ∩ T ) ∩ S| > εTN/2 and |z ∩ S| ≤ εSN .
To bound the probability of these events, let us suppose that the transformation knows the identity of set
S in addition to the input x. The likelihood of the first event is then maximized if all coordinates of z lie
outside of S. Since T \S is uniformly random over the coordinates outside S, the probability of the first event
is bounded by the probability that N indicator variables, each set to 1 with probability |T\S|n−|S| =
N/2−εSTN
n−N/2 ,
has sum greater than εTN/2. By Lemma 1, this occurs with probability at most e
−ǫTN/6, as long as
ǫTN/2 > 2N
N/2−εSTN
n−N/2 . Note that this is implied by ǫT > 2N/n, which is true for our choice of parameters.
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The second event is most likely if |z∩S| = εSN , in which case it occurs if the εSN coordinates of S chosen
to be in z ∩ S contain εTN/2 coordinates of T . As each coordinate of S is equally likely to be in T , this
is precisely the probability that εSN indicator variables, each set to 1 with probability |S ∩ T |/|S| = 2εST ,
has sum greater than εTN/2. By Lemma 1, this probability is at most e
−ǫTN/6, as long as ǫT /2 > 4ǫST ǫS .
Assuming ǫST = 2ǫS, this is satisfied as long as ǫT > 16ǫ
2
S, which is true for our choice of parameters.
Taking a union bound over these two events applied to the en
ǫ
queries made by the mechanism on input
x, we have that with probability at least ζ , 2en
ǫ
e−ǫTN/6, MS,T (x) is equal (as a distribution) to MA(x).
Note that ζ approaches 0 with n faster than any polynomial, as long as ǫTN > n
2ǫ. We therefore have that
ET∼ΓS [Ey∼MS,T (x)[T · y]] ≥ ET∼ΓS [Ey∼MA(x)[T · y]]− ζN
≥ ET∼ΓS [Ey∼MA(x)[T · y · x]]− ζN
≥ ǫST
2
ET∼ΓS [Wel(MA, x)]− ζN
≥ ǫST
2
ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , x)]− 2ζN.
Where in the first and last inequalities we used that, conditional on being non-identical, MS,T and MA
can have welfares differing by at most N . We also used that, from our choice of randomness over T , each
coordinate of x is contained in T with probability at most |S ∩ T |/|S| = εST /2.
Applying this inequality to (1), we conclude that
2εTN + 2ζN ≥ ǫST
2
ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , x)] (2)
which gives the desired result.
Finally, we show that the welfare bound from the previous lemma extends to any input that does not
have a large intersection with T . This is because the transformation wil not be able to distinguish any such
input from one satisfying the conditions of Lemma 4, with high probability.
Lemma 5. Fix any Z with |Z| ∈ [N/2, N ]. Then
E(S,T )∼Γ[Wel(MS,T , Z)
∣∣|Z ∩ T | ≤ ǫTN/2] ≤ 5εTN
εST
= O
(
N
n1/4
)
.
Proof. We will apply an argument very similar to the proof of Lemma 4. As in the previous lemma,
the probability that the transformation can distinguish between MS,T and MA on input Z is at most
ζ , 2en
ǫ
e−ǫTN/6, even if the transformation is made aware of the identity of set S and of Z ∩ T , and the
probability is only with respect to randomness in T \Z. We therefore have
E(S,T )∼Γ[Wel(MS,T , Z)] ≤ ζN +Wel(MA, Z)
= ζN + E(S,T )∼Γ[Wel(MA, Z)
∣∣S ⊆ Z, S ∩ T = z ∩ T ]
≤ 2ζN + E(S,T )∼Γ[Wel(MS,T , Z)
∣∣S ⊆ Z, S ∩ T = z ∩ T ]
≤ 4N εT
εST
+ 2ζN + 4ζN/εST
which is at most 5N εTεST for sufficiently large N , where in the second-to-last inequality we used the fact thatMA(Z) and MS,T (Z) are identical with probability at least 1 − ζ under the conditions of Lemma 4 (as
shown in the proof of that lemma), and the last inequality is Lemma 4.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we recall that x ∼ D satisfies |x| ∈ [N/2, N ] with probability at
least 1− e−N/64, and the probability that |Z ∩ T | > ǫTN/2 is at most e−ǫTN/6. Thus, by Lemma 5 plus the
fact that no allocation can generate welfare greater than N , we have that
ES,T∼Γ[Wel(MS,T )] ≤ 5 εT
εST
N +N · (e−N/64 + e−ǫTN/6) ≤ 6 · 16 ·N/n1/4
for our setting of εT and εST . There must therefore be a particular choice of S and T such thatWel(MS,T ) ≤
6 · 16 ·N/n1/4. Since Wel(AS,T ) ≥ N/4 by Lemma 2, the theorem holds for this particular choice of AS,T ,
for any c > 1/4.
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4 A Lower Bound for Multi-Dimensional Transformations
We now move on to our main result, which is a lower bound for multi-dimensional DSIC transformations.
Our construction uses only a single agent, and therefore also shows a lower bound for multi-dimensional BIC
transformations.
To show a lower bound for multi-dimensional transformations, we consider a slightly different setting
with a single agent and multiple goods. There is now a single agent, who has an additive valuation over
n goods.3 A type is still an n-dimensional vector of values, say (x1, . . . , xn), where xi is the agent’s value
for good i. The outcome space is binary: an outcome is a binary vector (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n. However,
unlike in the previous section, agent values are not necessarily binary. We are still concerned with welfare
maximization, and we will focus on mechanisms that are DSIC. That is, mechanisms for which the agent
maximizes their expected utility by declaring their true type.
4.1 Construction
We will set parameters N , εT , εS , εST precisely as in Section 3 for the proof of Theorem 2. The type space
will be X = {0, 1, α}n, where we will choose α = 2ǫ−1ST > 1.
The distribution D selects x ∈ X by first drawing every coordinate xi ∼ Bernoulli
(
3N
4n
)
. Then, for each
coordinate with xi = 1, we will (independently) instead set xi = α with probability p = 1/α. Note then that
conditional on xi being non-zero, E[xi] < 2.
Even though types are no longer binary vectors, we can still think of a set associated with each x ∈ X ,
corresponding to the non-zero indices of x. So, for example, |x ∩ T | is the number of indices in T that are
non-zero in x. With this understanding, we note that algorithm AS,T from Section 3 is well-defined also in
our augmented domain, for a given valid pair of sets S and T . We also note that since the probability that
any given coordinate is non-zero matches that from our construction in Section 3, the distribution over sets
implied by this type distribution remains unchanged.
4.2 Adapting the MIDR lower bound
We will prove the following variation of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. There are constants ǫ > 0 and c > 0 such that the following is true for the setting described
above. For any DSIC black-box transformationM with query complexity enǫ , there exists an algorithm A and
distribution D such that Wel(MA) ≤ Wel(A)nc . This is true even if the feasibility constraint F is restricted
to be downward-closed.
Our proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 2. The following lemmas are similar to Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 from Section 3, and we only sketch the differences in their (nearly identical) proofs. The only
distinction is that one must account for the fact that the expected welfare might increase by a factor of 2
due to the expected value of a non-zero coordinate lying in [1, 2].
Lemma 6. For any valid pair S and T , Wel(AS,T ) ≥ N4 = Ω(N).
Proof. Let x be an input drawn from the input distribution. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we have that
|x| ∈ [N/2, N ] and |x ∩ T | ≤ εTN with probability at least 1/2. This implies that, with probability at least
1/2, AS,T (x) allocates 1 to each non-zero entry in x, of which there are at least N/2. Since E[xi|xi > 0] > 1
for each i, the expected welfare generated by AS,T is at least N/4.
Lemma 7. PrS,T∼Γ[Wel(MS,T , T ) > 2εTN ] < enǫ · e−(ǫS−ǫST )N/4 = O(e−n1/4).
Proof. Choose some valid pair S and T . Since E[xi|xi > 0] < 2 for each i, the only way for Wel(MS,T , T )
to be greater than 2εTN is for it to allocate 1 to at least εTN elements of T . For this to occur on input T ,
the transformation must query at least one input x such that |AS,T (x) ∩ T | > εTN . The proof now follows
in exactly the same way as Lemma 3.
3In a slight abuse of notation, we are using n for the number of goods in this setting rather than the number of agents. This
is intentional, to draw a parallel between this parameter and the number of agents in Section 3.
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We will next prove the following variation of Lemma 4. The statement is the same, but we will use the
DSIC constraint rather than the MIDR constraint.
Lemma 8. Choose S with |S| = N/2 and some x ⊃ S with |x| ∈ [N/2, N ]. Then
ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , x)
∣∣x ∩ T = S ∩ T ] ≤ 5εTN
εST
= O
(
N
n1/4
)
.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4, we can bound the probability that on input x the mechanism finds a
query point z such that |z| ≤ N and AS,T (z) = ∅, say by some ζ that vanishes faster than any polynomial
in n. This part of the proof carries over without change.
Next, we apply the matching characterization of IC, Theorem 1, to a pair of types: x and α · T . That is,
we will choose X ′ = {x, α · T }, and apply Theorem 1 to the graph G(X ′). This yields
α ·Wel(MS,T , T ) +Wel(MS,T , x) ≥ α · Ey∼MS,T (x)[T · y].
This is because the left hand side is precisely the weight of the identity matching, and the right hand side is
the weight of the edge from α · T to x.
Taking an expectation over all T such that S, T are valid and x ∩ T = S ∩ T , and applying our bound
on the likelihood that MS,T is identical to MA, we have
α · ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , T )] + ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , x)] ≥ α · ET∼ΓS
[
Ey∼MS,T (x)[T · y]
]
≥ α · ǫSTN|x| · ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T (x), x)] − 2ζN
≥ α · ǫST · ET∼ΓS [Wel(MS,T , x)]− 2ζN.
Rearranging and applying Lemma 3, we have
Wel(MS,T , x) ≤ 2ζN
αǫST − 1 +
2αǫT
αǫST − 1N.
Set α = 2ǫ−1ST to get the desired result.
The remainder of the proof of Theorem 3 then follows precisely as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Recall that for a single agent, BIC and DSIC are equivalent. Thus, as a corollary of Theorem 3, there
is no polytime BIC black-box reduction for multiple additive bidders with independently-distributed item
values, even for downward-closed feasibility constraints.
Theorem 4. There are constants ǫ > 0 and c > 0 such that the following is true in the setting of additive
buyers with independently-distributed values for items. For any BIC black-box transformation M with query
complexity en
ǫ
, there exists an algorithm A and distribution D such that Wel(MA) ≤ Wel(A)nc . This is true
even if the feasibility constraint F is restricted to be downward-closed.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented impossibility results for black-box reductions when agent types are drawn in-
dependently from known priors, and the goal is to maximize welfare in expectation over these types. We
showed that there are no polytime black-box reductions for BIC welfare maximization with additive bidders,
even when there is only a single bidder and even for downward-closed feasibility constraints. This pairs with
the existence of BIC black-box reductions for welfare whose query complexity scales with the support size
of each agent’s type distribution [10, 9], and shows that this dependence is unavoidable. We also showed
the impossibility of black-box reductions for MIDR welfare maximization with n single-dimensional bidders,
again in comparison with the BIC case where such reductions are possible.
An important question that remains open is whether there is an O(1)-approximate DSIC black-box
reduction for expected welfare with single-parameter agents, even when restricting to downward-closed fea-
sibility constraints. Note that if values lie in [1, H ], then an O(logH) approximation is implied by Babaioff,
Lavi, and Pavlov, and this also implies an O(log n) approximation [1]. Can this be improved to a constant
approximation?
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